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A REVIEW OF THE RETALIATORY LAWS
Retaliatory laws are those statutes pertaining to insurance which
are a part of most of the states' regulatory systems. These laws
are a sort of tariff' thrown around a state's borders to protect the
domestic companies within and to insure fair treatment of these com-
panies in other states. They are also the price of admission for for-
eign companies seeking to do business in the states.
Their existence dates back at least a hundred years.2 While their
principal application is in the field of insurance, there are evidences
of retaliatory statutes in several other spheres.8 With regard to the
insurance statutes there are retaliatory laws in some thirty-seven
states today.4 The phraseology and effects of these statutes vary
from state to state, but their ultimate effect seems clear enough-
that is, they are ". . . designed to protect insurance companies from
discriminations and impositions which might be made against them
by other states." 5 A typical statute is that of South Carolina which
states:
Whenever the laws of any state of the United States shall
require of insurance companies chartered by this state and hav-
ing agencies in such other state, or of the agents thereof, any
deposit of securities in such state for protection of policy holders
or otherwise in any payment of pena;Aes certificates of authori-
ty, license fees or otherwise, greater than the amount required
for such purposes from similar companies of other states by the
then existing laws of this state, all similar companies of such states
establishing or having therefore established an agency or agen-
cies in this state shall make the same deposit for like purpose
with the commissioner and pay to the commissioner, for penal-
ties, certificates of authority, license fees, filing fee or any other
fee, an amount equal to the amount of such charges imposed by
the laws of such state upon companies of this State and the
agencies thereof.
6
1. Patterson, R. W., THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES
(1927).
2. Statutes of New Hampshire (1852), cited in Haverhill Insurance Company
v. Prescott, 42 N. H. 547, 80 Am. Dec. 123 (1861).
3. Examples are: decedent's estates, registration and taxation of motor ve-
hides. See "Reciprocal and Retaliatory Statutes", note 43 HAv. L. Rv. 641
(1929).
4. Leavey, H. H., "Retaliatory Laws in the United States", INSURANCE LAW
JouRNA., (February, 1953).
5. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Knowlton, 94 N. H. 409, 54 A. 2d
163 (1947).
6. CODE OF LAws OV SOUTH CAROLINA, § 37-132 (1952).
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While it might appear at first glance that such statutes were enacted
for revenue measures, the courts in interpreting these statutes have
held the tax feature not to be the primary purpose behind the re-
taliatory law, despite the amount derived therefrom.7 In fact, one
court has recently declared that the success of the statute depends
on how little is collected under its terms rather than how much.8
The essential function is generally said to be the prevention of un-
favorable discrimination against domestic companies by other states
exercising their taxing powers.9  As one court has put it, ". .. [t]he
so-called retaliatory clauses in insurance statutes are not in fact re-
taliatory provisions, but are clauses based upon principles of comity,
and are designed to create substantial equality of burdens upon for-
eign and domestic corporations."' 0  The object of these laws was
defined in another jurisdiction as achieving reciprocity by statute.;1
In sharp contrast is another court's opinion which speaks of the
object as being retaliatory, not the obtaining of reciprocity by statute,
and holding that such retaliatory legislation must be strictly con-
strued.12  An Ohio court said: "... reciprocity expresses the act
of interchange of favors between persons or nations; retaliation,
that of returning evil for evil, disfavor for disfavor."' 8
In elaborating on the coverage of these laws most courts general-
ly hold that they must be strictly construed 14 and are not to be
applied in any situation that is not within the scope of such an en-
actment. This construction is usually justified on the basis that the
laws are penal or qtasi-criminal in nature. Nor are these statutes
to be invoked until it appears that inequitable discrimination has been
clearly established.15
Constitutionality
It was first thought that retaliatory statutes were unconstitutional,
7. Patific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lowe, 354 IIl. 398, 188 N. E. 436, 91
A. L. 1R. 788, Ann. 795 (1933).
8. Commonwealth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 369 Pa. 560, 87 A. 2d 255
(1952).
9. Home Indemnity Co. of New York v. O'Brien, 104 F. 2d 413 (6th Cir.,
1946).
10. Employers Gas Co. v. Hobbs, 152 Kan. 815, 107 P. 2d 715 (1941).
11. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Welch, 29 Kan. 672 (1883). Bankers Life Co. v.
Richardson, 192 Cal. 113, 121 Pac. 586 (1923).
12. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Boys, 296 I1. 166, 129 N. E. 724 (1920).
13. State ex rel Atty. Gen. v. Fidelity & C. Ins. Co., 49 Ohio St. 430, 31
N. E. 658, 162 L. R. A. 611, 34 Am. St. Rep. 573 (1892).
14. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Richardson, note 10 supra; Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Boys, note 12 supra.
15. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Knowlton, 94 N. H. 409, 54 A. 2d
163 (1947).
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and as such they were attacked on several different grounds.' 8 The
objection that the retaliatory laws violated the constitutional pro-
vision for equal protection of the laws was disposed of by the holding
that this tax was in reality a license fee imposed on foreign corpora-
tions for doing business in the state, and that until a corporation
qualified by meeting this condition it is not a ". . . person within
the jurisdiction of the state to which the clause as to equal protection
of the laws would apply. 1 7  A subsequent argument was made that
such laws were unconsitutional as delegating the retaliating states'
legislative power to the legislature of the state being retaliated against.
The answer generally made to tl!is contention is that it is a valid
use of the legislative power to enact a law which is made dependent
upon a contingency.15 One state court did sustain this argument in
finding its statute unconstitutional. 19 The contention was made that
the law levies different fees on different members within the same
class, but this has been rejected.20 Another defense raised was that
the taxes paid were in violation of the constitutional requirements of
equality and uniformity. The courts have in all decisions overruled
this objection.
2 1
It was believed that if insurance contracts ever became subject to
the laws of interstate commerce, the retaliatory laws among the dif-
ferent states would be declared unconstitutional.2 Prior to 1944
insurance was not commerce according to the United States Supreme
Court.93 In a historic reversal, the Court said that insurance trans-
actions were commerce and when conducted across state lines were
interstate commerce.2 4 This decision had tremendous repercussions,
for, until this time, governmental regulation of the insurance indus-
try had been exercised by the state under the ruling that insurance
was not subject to interstate commerce. All this past history of ex-
periences in control and supervision seemed lost. Congress inter-
16. "Constitutionality, Construction, Operation and Effect of Retaliatory Sta-
tutes Against Foreign Corporations Doing Business Within State", 91 A. L. R.
795 (1934).
17. Fire Association of Philadelphia v. New York, 119 U. S. 110 (1886),
affirming 92 N. Y. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 380 (1883).
18. Home Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 104 Ill. 653 (1882).
19. State v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 223 Ala. 134, 134 So. 858, 77 A. L. R.
1486 (1931).
20. Home Insurance Co. v. Swigert, note 18 supra.
21. State ex rel Baldwin v. Insurance Co., 115 Ind. ?57, 17 N. E. 574 (1888);
Clay v. Dixie F. Ins. Co., 168 Ky. 315, 181 S. W. 1123 (1916), overruling Wes-
tern & S. L. Ins. 'V. Comm'r, 133 Ky. 292, 117 S. W. 376 (1909); Common-
wealth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 369 Pa. 560, 87 A. 2d 255 (1952).
22. "Retaliatory Taxation 'of Insurance Companies". 27 VA. L. Rtv. 686
(1941).
23. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall (U. S.) 168 (1868).
24. U. S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
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vened the next year by passing the McCarran Act5 which provided,
in effect, for the restoration of governmental controls to the states.
In the interim there was uncertainty as to the status of insurance
regulation. Many states attempted to relinquish their controls by
equaliziug taxes between foreign and domestic insurance companies26
under an anticipated federal interference. This threat was dissipated,
however, by another Supreme Court decision in which the Court held
that South Carolina could impose a tax upon a foreign insurance
company as a condition for doing business within the state, even when
no tax was required of the domestic companies.2 7 Following on the
heels of this decision came several insurance cases2 8 before the Court
in which the constitutionality of the retaliatory tax statutes was sus-
tained. As a result of the McCarran Act and these later cases, the
states once more had the support and the authority to continue
regulation and taxation of the insurance business.
2 9
Mechanics
The necessary events which invoke the use of the statute may arise
in a variety of ways, depending, of course, on the state statute. It may
be merely a law passed in another state.30 Since these laws pre-
suppose that there are two states involved, namely the state retaliat-
ing (R) and the state retaliated against (A), there must necessarily
be three parties involved, the third being the insurance company or
companies caught in the middle. In order for A state's insurance
company to be admitted to state R, the restrictions imposed by
the legislature of state A would have to be compared to those of
State R. This comparison may be done by either of two methods,
the aggregate, or the item-by-item comparison. The aggregate method
is a compilation of the total burdens imposed by a state, including
taxes, fees, charges, licenses, etc. The item-by-item approach is mere-
ly a comparison of one particular item between the two states in-
volved. Some states require the use of the aggregate method by
statute.31 State R's insurance commissioner will accordingly conduct
the comparison and if state A's restrictions, taxes, and impositions
25. 59 Stat. 34, c. 20; 15 NSCA, §§ 1011-1015 (1945).
26. Ekern, G. L., "The Regulation of Insurance", INstURANcE LAw JOURNAL
(June 1951).
27. Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408
(1946).
28. it re Insurance Cases, 328 U. S. 822 (1946).
29. Freedman, Warren, RicHARDs ON THE LAw OF INSURANCE, § 50 (5th
Ed. 1952).
30. Phoenix Insurance Company v. Welch, 29 Kan. 672 (1883).
31. ILLINOIS INSURANCE CODE, § 444.
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NOTES
total more than state R's, or if any comparable item is more severe,
depending upon the method employed, then the insurance company
seeking admittance from state A will be taxed that difference.
3 2
Interpretations vary as to what items and restrictions should be
included in these comparisons. Among the more generally included
items are: deposit of securities for the protection of policy holders,
penalties, licenses, premium taxes, and various charges. Whether
municipal taxes should be included is an unsettled question, although
the present tendency seems to be to include this item in comparison. 33
This issue will be considered in connection with the next section
of this note.
Present Problems
The retaliatory laws have raised many interesting and complicated
problems which have had widespread ramifications. It is to be kept
in mind in dealing with these applications of retaliatory laws that not
only are there two governments involved, but others also are vitally
interested in their decisions. None of these controversies are ever
distinct and isolated since each state is peculiarly affected by another
state's actions, and, of course, insurance companies domiciled in each
respective state are also vitally affected.
One recent problem arose when the Ohio legislature passed a law
permitting the state to monopolize the workmen's compensation in-
surance business in the state. Its effect was to exclude all private
companies whether they be foreign or domestic insurers. An immedi-
ate reaction came from Pennsylvania where Ohio companies were
writing workmen's compensation insurance. The Pennsylvania In-
surance Commission decided to invoke the state's retaliatory law and
deny licenses to the Ohio companies on the ground that Ohio's action
of excluding Pennsylvania's companies came within the meaning of
the word "prohibition", specifically mentioned in the pertinent statute.
On appeal to a reviewing court, the order was reversed. The court
was of the opinion that the act of Ohio did not constitute a prohibi-
tion since Ohio accords no favoritism to the domestic companies nor
any discrimination against foreign insurers. In discussing the inter-
pretation of the statutory term "prohibition", the court thought that
even though the Ohio framers intended a literal construction of that
term in the statute, still it was not within the spirit or intention of
retaliatory law.3 4 The legislature, apparently dissatisfied with the
32. Employers Casualty Co. v. Hobbs, 149 Kan. 774, 89 P. 2d 923 (1939).
33. John Hancock Mutual Life v. Pink, 276 N. Y. 421, 12 A. 2d 529 (1938).
34. Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Neel, 55 Dauph 325 (Pa.
1945).
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ruling, in the session following the decision amended the statute in
such a way that companies coming from states with such monopolis-
tic workmen's compensation acts would be denied licenses in Penn-
sylvania. This feeling later died down and a subsequent amendment
Was passed in the legislature to restore the statute to its original form.
Whether municipal taxes should be included within retaliating im-
positions is a subject of recent litigation in several states and the
courts are divided on the point. The jurisdictions which hold that it
should be included in retaliatory calculations go on the assumption
that municipalities are political subdivisions of the state 5 and that
the taxes by these bodies can be connected to the state's program
through the authority of the state's enabling act.3 6 In contrast is
a recent Massachusetts decision which holds that municipal taxes
should not be included in the state's burden because these payments
of taxes are conditions of doing business in these cities but npt in
the state.8 7 Connecticut, New Jersey, and Maryland have gone so
far as to pass statutes to insure that municipal taxes be included in
these retaliatory provisions.
Another problem which has been the source of litigation is the
passing by a state of a tax or license which affects life insurance
companies. Would this imposition be considered by a retaliating
state as affecting all insurance companies coming from the former
state or just the life insurance companies? To be kept in mind are
the applicable statutes which generally read ". . . from similar com-
panies from other states." One state has answered this by saying
that such a situation applies only to like companies.38 There are
states that have broadened their statutes to require retaliation against
all insurance companies regardless of the line engaged in by the com-
pany. Such statutes could prove to be catastrophic if their results
were carried to an extreme.
Conclsions
After a hundred years or more of experience with retaliatory laws,
what can be said for their achievements? There seems to be no
doubt that such laws are generally believed to be necessary since
they are enacted in over three-quarters of our states. Whether they
have obtained their objectives, which was said to be the equalization of
35. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 350, 25 S. W. 2d 748
(1930).
36, "Jhn Nancock .Mutual Life v. Pink, note 33 supra.
37. iremian's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 325 Mqss. 386, 90 N. E. 2d
668 (1950).
38. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Brown, 92 Vt. 390, 104 At. 235 (1918).
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taxes payable and prevention of discrimination, is uncertain. It can be
said, however, that these laws are potent, whether in use or not, and
it is not to be believed that, because there seems to be a scarcity of
litigation nowadays concerning such laws, they have suddenly fallen
into obscurity. Their latent authority defies such an opinion.
The constitutionality of the retaliatory statutes has been bitterly
contested, especially on the grounds that they were in violation of
the equal protection of the laws and were an unlawful delegation of
legislative power. But with few exceptions their constitutionality
has been sustained. After the South-Eastern Under-writers Associa-
tion decision, state retaliatory laws unquestionably impeded interstate
commerce and were invalid until Congress passed the McCarran Act
permitting the states to continue to regulate and tax the business of
insurance, even though it was interstate commerce.
In determining the operative features of the retaiiatory laws special
attention should be given to the precise wording of the statute. In
several cases one word has played a key part. i or instance, the
words "prohibition", 9 "obligations" 40 and several other such words
have called for special interpretation by the courts. There is definite-
ly a burden upon the insurance commissioner to fully understand
another state's theory and practice before resorting to the use of
these retaliatory laws.4 ' The method of the computation must be
carefully selected so as not to prejudice any of the parties and to make
it possible to stay within the confines of the statutes. Two methods
of comparison have been used by the different insurance commission-
ers, namely the aggregate and the item-by-item methods of computa-
tion. The aggregate method has enjoyed the widest use.
The present problems illustrate the character of the controversies
throughout the country. The action may be over the construction of
a statute, the imposition of a tax or fee, or may represent a new legis-
lative enactment which has as its purpose the exclusion of certain
types of policies. Exclusion, or "prohibition," constitutes one of the
most serious threats in invoking the retaliatory statutes. Through
the years there have been cases where the entire business from one
state has been excluded from doing business in another.42 The cases
have represented in varying degrees the type of discrimination which
is so repugnant to the commerce clause,48 no matter how forthright
39. Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Neel, Note 34
supra.
40. Commonwealth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., Note 21 supra.
41. Note 4 mtpra.
42. Talbott v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 74 Md. 536, 22 Atl. 395 (1891).
43. S. C. Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177 (1937).
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or ingenious.4 4 Fortunately not many cases involving retaliatory
statutes go to this extent.
What can be said for the continued use of these laws looking
back over a century of application, litigation, and experience? Can it
be said that the retaliatory statutes are necessary to any state's regu-
latory systems and control and that they are really beneficial to the
domestic insurers and the general public? There can be little doubt
that this poses a very difficult question, especially since these laws
have become an integral part of our regulatory system. That is not
to say, however, that their continued existence is beyond question
or that the present day situation lacks any need for reform. We
have progressed through these laws from a stage of isolated states
with high tariff barriers thrown around them for the protection of
domestic insurers to a modem-day development of interstate coopera-
tion created by the vast and complex needs of a constantly changing
society. Whether the retaliatory laws are to survive -will depend
greatly on this continued cooperation among the states and the judicial
sanction left to their use by the courts.
WnIAm C. DAVIS, JR.
44. Best and Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 (1940).
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